Control Hijacking

Control Hijacking: Defenses

Acknowledgments: Lecture slides are from the Computer Security course taught by Dan Boneh at Stanford University. When slides are obtained from other sources, a a reference will be noted on the bottom of that slide. A full list of references is provided on the last slide.

Recap: control hijacking attacks

Stack smashing: overwrite return address or function pointer

Heap spraying: reliably exploit a heap overflow

Use after free: attacker writes to freed control structure, which then gets used by victim program

Integer overflows

Format string vulnerabilities

⋮

The mistake: mixing data and control

- An ancient design flaw:
  - enables anyone to inject control signals

- 1971: AT&T learns never to mix control and data

Control hijacking attacks

The problem: mixing data with control flow in memory



Later we will see that mixing data and code is also the reason for XSS, a common web vulnerability

Preventing hijacking attacks

1. Fix bugs:
   - Audit software
     - Automated tools: Coverity, Infer, … (more on this next week)
   - Rewrite software in a type safe languange (Java, Go, Rust)
     - Difficult for existing (legacy) code …

2. Platform defenses: prevent attack code execution

3. Add runtime code to detect overflows exploits
   - Halt process when overflow exploit detected
   - StackGuard, CFI, LibSafe, …

Transform:

Complete Breach

↓

Denial of service

Control Hijacking

Platform Defenses

Marking memory as non-execute (DEP)

Prevent attack code execution by marking stack and heap as **non-executable**

- NX-bit on AMD Athlon 64, XD-bit on Intel P4 Prescott
  - NX bit in every Page Table Entry (PTE)
- Deployment:
  - Linux (via PaX project); OpenBSD
  - Windows: since XP SP2 (DEP)
    - Visual Studio: **/NXCompat[:NO]**
- Limitations:
  - Some apps need executable heap (e.g. JITs).
  - Does not defend against `**Return Oriented Programming**' exploits

Examples: DEP controls in Windows



DEP terminating a program

Attack: Return Oriented Programming (ROP)

- Control hijacking without executing code



ROP: in more detail

To run /bin/sh we must direct ***stdin*** and ***stdout*** to the socket:

```
dup2(s, 0)         // map stdin to socket
dup2(s, 1)         // map stdout to socket
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

Gadgets in victim code:

Stack (set by attacker):



ROP: in even more detail

dup2(s,0) implemented as a sequence of gadgets in victim code:



Dan Boneh

Response: randomization

- **ASLR**: (Address Space Layout Randomization)
  - Map shared libraries to rand location in process memory
    ⇒ Attacker cannot jump directly to exec function
  - Deployment: (/DynamicBase)
    - **Windows 7**: 8 bits of randomness for DLLs
    - **Windows 8:** 24 bits of randomness on 64-bit processors
- Other randomization methods:
  - Sys-call randomization: randomize syscall id's
  - Instruction Set Randomization (ISR)

ASLR Example

Booting twice loads libraries into different locations:

ntlanman.dll	0x6D7F0000	Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntmarta.dll	0x75370000	Windows NT MARTA provider
ntshrui.dll	0x6F2C0000	Shell extensions for sharing
ole32.dll	0x76160000	Microsoft OLE for Windows

ntlanman.dll	0x6DA90000	Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntmarta.dll	0x75660000	Windows NT MARTA provider
ntshrui.dll	0x6D9D0000	Shell extensions for sharing
ole32.dll	0x763C0000	Microsoft OLE for Windows

Note: everything in process memory must be randomized
stack, heap, shared libs, base image

- Win 8 **Force ASLR**: ensures all loaded modules use ASLR

A very different idea: kBouncer



Observation: abnormal execution sequence

- ***ret*** returns to an address that does not follow a ***call***

Idea: before a syscall, check that every prior ret is not abnormal

- How: use Intel's *Last Branch Recording* (LBR)

A very different idea: kBouncer



Inte's **Last Branch Recording** (LBR):

- store 16 last executed branches in a set of on-chip registers (MSR)
- read using ***rdmsr*** instruction from privileged mode

kBouncer: before entering kernel, verify that last 16 ***rets*** are normal

- Requires no app. code changes, and minimal overhead
- Limitations: attacker can ensure 16 calls prior to syscall are valid

Control Hijacking Defenses

Hardening the executable

Run time checking: StackGuard

- Many run-time checking techniques …
  - we only discuss methods relevant to overflow protection

- <u>Solution 1</u>: StackGuard
  - Run time tests for stack integrity.
  - Embed “canaries” in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return.



Canary Types

- Random canary:
  - Random string chosen at program startup.
  - Insert canary string into every stack frame.
  - Verify canary before returning from function.
    - Exit program if canary changed.
      - Turns potential exploit into DoS.
  - To corrupt, attacker must learn current random string.

- Terminator canary: Canary = {0, newline, linefeed, EOF}
  - String functions will not copy beyond terminator.
  - Attacker cannot use string functions to corrupt stack.

StackGuard (Cont.)

- StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch
  - Program must be recompiled

- Minimal performance effects: 8% for Apache

- Note: Canaries do not provide full protection
  - Some stack smashing attacks leave canaries unchanged

StackGuard enhancements: ProPolice

- ProPolice (IBM) - gcc 3.4.1. (**-fstack-protector**)
  - Rearrange stack layout to prevent ptr overflow.



MS Visual Studio /GS [since 2003]

Compiler /GS option:

– Combination of ProPolice and Random canary.

– If cookie mismatch, default behavior is to call **_exit(3)**

Function prolog:

```
sub   esp, 8      // allocate 8 bytes for cookie
mov   eax, DWORD PTR ___security_cookie
xor   eax, esp      // xor cookie with current esp
mov   DWORD PTR [esp+8], eax   // save in stack
```

Function epilog:

```
mov   ecx, DWORD PTR  [esp+8]
xor   ecx, esp
call  @__security_check_cookie@4
add   esp, 8
```

Enhanced /GS in Visual Studio 2010:

– /GS protection added to all functions, unless can be proven unnecessary

/GS stack frame



Evading /GS with exception handlers

- When exception is thrown, dispatcher walks up exception list until handler is found (else use default handler)

After overflow: handler points to attacker's code

exception triggered ⇒ control hijack

Main point: exception is triggered before canary is checked



Defenses: SAFESEH and SEHOP

- /SAFESEH: linker flag
  - Linker produces a binary with a table of safe exception handlers
  - System will not jump to exception handler not on list

- /SEHOP: platform defense (since win vista SP1)
  - Observation: SEH attacks typically corrupt the "next" entry in SEH list.
  - SEHOP: add a dummy record at top of SEH list
  - When exception occurs, dispatcher walks up list and verifies dummy record is there. If not, terminates process.

Summary: Canaries are not full proof

- Canaries are an important defense tool, but do not prevent all control hijacking attacks:
  - Heap-based attacks still possible
  - Integer overflow attacks still possible
  - /GS by itself does not prevent Exception Handling attacks

(also need SAFESEH and SEHOP)

Even worse: canary extraction

A common design for crash recovery:

- When process crashes, restart automatically (for availability)
- Often canary is unchanged (reason: relaunch using fork)

Danger:

- canary extraction byte by byte



Similarly: extract ASLR randomness

A common design for crash recovery:

- When process crashes, restart automatically (for availability)
- Often canary is unchanged (reason: relaunch using fork)

Danger:

Extract ret-addr to de-randomize code location

Extract stack function pointers to de-randomize heap



What if can't recompile: Libsafe

- Solution 2: Libsafe (Avaya Labs)
  - Dynamically loaded library (no need to recompile app.)
  - Intercepts calls to strcpy (dest, src)
    - Validates sufficient space in current stack frame:

      |frame-pointer - dest| > strlen(src)

    - If so, does strcpy. Otherwise, terminates application



More methods: Shadow Stack

Shadow Stack: keep a copy of the stack in memory

- **On call**: push ret-address to shadow stack on call
- **On ret**: check that top of shadow stack is equal to ret-address on stack. Crash if not.
- Security: memory corruption should not corrupt shadow stack

Shadow stack using **Intel CET:**

- New register SSP: shadow stack pointer
- Shadow stack pages marked by a new "shadow stack" attribute:
  only "call" and "ret" can read/write these pages

Control Hijacking Defenses

Control Flow Integrity (CFI)

Control flow integrity (CFI) [ABEL'05, …]

Ultimate Goal: ensure control flows as specified by code's flow graph

```
void HandshakeHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
      ...
      s->hdlr(s, pkt);
}
```

Compile time: build list of possible call targets

Run time: before call, check validity of s->hdlr

Lots of academic research on CFI systems:

- CCFIR (2013), kBouncer (2013), FECFI (2014), CSCFI (2015), …

and many attacks …

Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)

Poor man's version of CFI:

- Protects indirect calls by checking against a bitmask of all valid function entry points in executable

```
rep stosd
mov     esi, [esi]
mov     ecx, esi          ; Target
push    1
call    @_guard_check_icall@4 ; _guard_check_icall(x)
call    esi
add     esp, 4
xor     eax, eax
```

ensures target is the entry point of a function

CFI using Intel CET

New **EndBranch** (ENDBR64) instruction:

- After an indirect **JMP** or **CALL**: the next instruction in the instruction stream must be **EndBranch**
- If not, then trigger a #CP fault and halt execution
- Ensures an indirect JMP or CALL can only go to a valid target address $\Rightarrow$ no func. ptr. hijack

(compiler inserts EndBranch at valid locations)



Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)

Poor man's version of CFI:

- P … of
  a

- Does not prevent attacker from causing a jump to a valid <u>**wrong**</u> function

```
rep
mov
mov
push
call    @_guard_check_icall@4 ; _guard_check_icall(x)
call    esi
add     esp, 4
xor     eax, eax
```

… s
… of a

An example

```
void HandshakeHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
    s->hdlr = &LoginHandler;
    ... Buffer overflow over Session struct ...
}

void LoginHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
    bool auth = CheckCredentials(pkt);
    s->dhandler = &DataHandler;
}

void DataHandler(Session *s, char *pkt);
```

Attacker controls handler

static CFI: attacker can call **DataHandler** to bypass authentication

Cryptographic Control Flow Integrity (CCFI)
(ARM pointer authentication)

Threat model: attacker can read/write **anywhere** in memory,
program should not deviate from its control flow graph

CCFI approach: Every time a jump address is written/copied anywhere in memory:
compute 64-bit AES-MAC and append to address

On heap: tag = AES(k, (jump-address, 0 ll source-address))

on stack: tag = AES(k, (jump-address, 1 ll stack-frame))

Before following address, verify AES-MAC and crash if invalid

Where to store key k? In xmm registers (not memory)

Back to the example

```
void HandshakeHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
      s->hdlr = &LoginHandler;
      ... Buffer overflow in Session struct ...
}

void LoginHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
      bool auth = CheckCredentials(pkt);
      s->dhandler = &DataHandler;
}

void DataHandler(Session *s, char *pkt);
```

Attacker controls handler

CCFI: Attacker cannot create a valid MAC for **DataHandler** address

THE END