

https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs155 CS155 Computer Security

Course overview

Acknowledgments: Lecture slides are from the Computer Security course taught by Dan Boneh at Stanford University. When slides are obtained from other sources, a a reference will be noted on the bottom of that slide. A full list of references is provided on the last slide.

The computer security problem

- Lots of buggy software
- Social engineering is very effective
- Money can be made from finding and exploiting vulns.
 - 1. Marketplace for vulnerabilities
 - 2. Marketplace for owned machines (PPI)
 - 3. Many methods to profit from owned machines

Lots of vulnerability disclosures (2015)

	Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1	Mac Os X	<u>Apple</u>	OS	<u>385</u>
2	Iphone Os	<u>Apple</u>	OS	<u>376</u>
3	Flash Player	<u>Adobe</u>	Application	<u>313</u>
4	<u>Air Sdk</u>	<u>Adobe</u>	Application	<u>246</u>
5	AIR	<u>Adobe</u>	Application	<u>246</u>
6	Air Sdk & Compiler	<u>Adobe</u>	Application	<u>246</u>
7	Internet Explorer	<u>Microsoft</u>	Application	<u>231</u>
8	<u>Chrome</u>	<u>Google</u>	Application	<u>187</u>
9	<u>Firefox</u>	<u>Mozilla</u>	Application	<u>178</u>
10	Windows Server 2012	<u>Microsoft</u>	OS	<u>155</u>
11	Ubuntu Linux	Canonical	OS	<u>152</u>
12	Windows 8.1	<u>Microsoft</u>	OS	<u>151</u>

source: www.cvedetails.com/top-50-products.php?year=2015

Lots of vulnerability disclosures (2018)

		Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
	1	Debian Linux	Debian	OS	<u>1130</u>
	2	Ubuntu Linux	Canonical	OS	<u>652</u>
	3	Android	Google	OS	<u>611</u>
	4	Enterprise Linux Server	Redhat	OS	<u>479</u>
	5	Enterprise Linux Workstation	Redhat	OS	<u>462</u>
	6	Enterprise Linux Desktop	Redhat	OS	<u>453</u>
	7	Firefox	Mozilla	Application	<u>333</u>
	8	Acrobat Reader Dc	Adobe	Application	<u>299</u>
	9	Acrobat Dc	Adobe	Application	<u>299</u>
	10	Windows 10	Microsoft	OS	<u>256</u>
	11	Sd 212 Firmware	Qualcomm	OS	<u>253</u>
	12	Sd 210 Firmware	Qualcomm	OS	<u>253</u>
urce: ٧	ww	.cvedetails.com/top-50-pro	ducts.php?yea	ar=2018	

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Vulnerable applications being exploited



Vulnerable applications being exploited



Mobile malware (Nov. 2013 - Oct. 2014)



The rise of mobile banking Trojans (Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2014

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Mobile malware



The rise of mobile banking Trojans (Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2018)

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Introduction

Sample attacks

Why own machines:

1. IP address and bandwidth stealing

Attacker's goal: look like a random Internet user

Use the IP address of infected machine or phone for:

- Spam (e.g. the storm botnet) Spamalytics: 1:12M pharma spams leads to purchase 1:260K greeting card spams leads to infection
- **Denial of Service:** Services: 1 hour (20\$), 24 hours (100\$)
- Click fraud (e.g. Clickbot.a)

Why own machines:

2. Steal user credentials and inject ads

keylog for banking passwords, web passwords, gaming pwds.

Example: SilentBanker (and many like it)



Lots of financial malware

1	Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre
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- 2 Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot
- 3 Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro
- 4 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Shiotob
- 5 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banbra
- 6 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Caphaw
- 7 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken
- 8 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Marcher
- 9 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba
- 10 Trojan-Banker.JS.Agent

- size: 3.5 KB
- spread via email attachments
- also found on home routers

Lots of financial malware

	Name	%*
1	Trojan.Win32. Zbot	26.3
2	Trojan.Win32. Nymaim	19.8
3	Backdoor.Win32. SpyEye	14.7
4	Backdoor.Win32. Caphaw	5.2
5	Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM	5.2
6	Backdoor.Win32. Emotet	4.9
7	Trojan.Win32. Neurevt	3.9
8	Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba	1.9
9	Trojan.Win32. Gozi	1.8
10	Trojan-Banker.Win32.Trickster	1.5

Users attacked: stats



≈ 300,000 users worldwide

A worldwide problem

Users attacked: stats



Users attacked: stats



A worldwide problem

Why own machines: 3. Ransomware

- 1 Trojan-Ransom.HTML.Agent
- 2 Trojan-Ransom.JS.Blocker
- 3 Trojan-Ransom.JS.InstallExtension
- 4 Trojan-Ransom.NSIS.Onion
- 5 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl
- 6 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptodef
- 7 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Snocry
- 8 Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter
- 9 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod
- 10 Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade

CryptoWall (2014-)

- targets Windows
- spread by spam emails

≈ 200,000 machines in 2015

A worldwide problem.

Why own machines: 3. Ransomware

	Name	Verdict	%*
1	WannaCry	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna	29.32
2	(generic verdict)	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny	11.43
3	GandCrab	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.GandCrypt	6.67
4	Cryakl	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl	4.59
5	PolyRansom/VirLock	Virus.Win32.PolyRansom	2.86
6	(generic verdict)	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen	2.40
7	Shade	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade	2.29
8	Cerber	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Zerber	2.20
9	Purgen/GlobeImposter	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Purgen	1.82
10	Crysis/Dharma	Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crusis	1.72

≈ 765,538machines in2018

A worldwide problem.

Why own machines: 4. Spread to isolated systems

Example: Stuxtnet

Windows infection \Rightarrow

Siemens PCS 7 SCADA control software on Windows \Rightarrow

Siemens device controller on isolated network

More on this later in course

Server-side attacks

- Financial data theft: often credit card numbers
 - Example: Target attack (2013), ≈ 140M CC numbers stolen
 - Many similar (smaller) attacks since 2000
- Political motivation:
 - Aurora, Tunisia Facebook (Feb. 2011), GitHub (Mar. 2015)
- Infect visiting users

Types of data stolen (2012-2015)



Source: California breach notification report, 2015

Example: Mpack

- PHP-based tools installed on compromised web sites
 - Embedded as an iframe on infected page
 - Infects browsers that visit site
- Features
 - management console provides stats on infection rates
 - Sold for several 100\$
 - Customer care can be purchased, one-year support contract
- Impact: 500,000 infected sites (compromised via SQL injection)
 Several defenses: e.g. Google safe browsing

Insider attacks: example

See: http://lwn.net/Articles/57135/

Insider attacks: example

Hidden trap door in Linux (nov 2003)

- Allows attacker to take over a computer
- Practically undetectable change (uncovered via CVS logs)

Inserted line in wait4()

if ((options == (_WCLONE|_WALL)) && (current->uid = 0))
retval = -EINVAL;

Looks like a standard error check, but ...

See: http://lwn.net/Articles/57135/

Many more examples

- Access to SIPRnet and a CD-RW: 260,000 cables \Rightarrow Wikileaks
- SysAdmin for city of SF government. Changed passwords, locking out city from router access
- Inside logic bomb took down 2000 UBS servers

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Can security technology help?



Source: California breach notification report, 2015



Introduction

The Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

Option 1: bug bounty programs (many)

- Google Vulnerability Reward Program: up to \$20K
- Microsoft Bounty Program: up to \$100K
- Mozilla Bug Bounty program: \$7500
- Pwn2Own competition: \$15K

Option 2:

• Zero day initiative (ZDI), iDefense: \$2K - \$25K

Example: Mozilla

Novel vulnerability and exploit, new form of exploitation or an exceptional vulnerability	High quality bug report with clearly exploitable critical vulnerability ₁	High quality bug report of a critical or high vulnerability ₂	Minimum for a high or critical vulnerability ₃	Medium vulnerability
\$10,000+	\$7,500	\$5,000	\$3,000	\$500 - \$2500

Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

Option 3: black market

ADOBE READER	\$5,000-\$30,000
MAC OSX	\$20,000-\$50,000
ANDROID	\$30,000-\$60,000
FLASH OR JAVA BROWSER PLUG-INS	\$40,000-\$100,000
MICROSOFT WORD	\$50,000-\$100,000
WINDOWS	\$60,000-\$120,000
FIREFOX OR SAFARI	\$60,000-\$150,000
CHROME OR INTERNET EXPLORER	\$80,000-\$200,000
IOS	\$100,000-\$250,000

Source: Andy Greenberg (Forbes, 3/23/2012)

Marketplace for owned machines

clients spam keylogger bot Pay-per-install (PPI) services **PPI operation: PPI** service 1. Own victim's machine 2. Download and install client's code 3. Charge client ns

Source: Cabalerro et al. (www.icir.org/vern/papers/ppi-usesec11.pdf)



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This course

Goals:

• Be aware of exploit techniques

• Learn to defend and avoid common exploits

• Learn to architect secure systems

This course

Part 1: **basics** (architecting for security)

- Securing apps, OS, and legacy code Isolation, authentication, and access control
- Part 2: Web security (defending against a web attacker)
- Building robust web sites, understand the browser security model
- Part 3: network security (defending against a network attacker)
- Monitoring and architecting secure networks.

Part 4: securing mobile applications

Don't try this at home !

Ken Thompson's clever Trojan